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Kaplan: Immigration Policy in Israel

IMMIGRATION POLICY OF ISRAEL:
THE UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE OF A JEWISH STATE
Yehiel S. Kaplan*

I.

IMMIGRATION POLICY OF ISRAEL

Israel was established in an attempt to create a shelter for
Jews in the Diaspora. The Law of Return was enacted several years
after the end of the Second World War. The Israeli legislature assumed that since Jews have suffered harsh persecutions and antiSemitism throughout history, as a minority group, it is legitimate to
discriminate in favor of those Jews who wish to immigrate to Israel.1
Jewish history—including the persecution of Jews in parts of the
world in the twentieth century and especially the holocaust of Jews in
Europe during the Second World War, when Jews did not have their
own independent state—was taken into consideration when Israel
formulated the immigration policy of the Jewish state. In addition, as
the nations of the world are granted the right of self-determination,
Israel, the state of the Jewish nation, enacted this law in an attempt to
maintain the Jewish majority in a Jewish and democratic state.
In the Law of Return, Israel granted Jews and those related to
Jews and married to them the right to immigrate to the Jewish state.
Section 1 of this law states that every Jew has a right to immigrate to
Israel: “Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh.”2
In the year 5730-1970 section 4A(a) in Law of Return (Amendment
No. 2) was added. It states:
The rights of a Jew under this law and the rights of an
oleh under the Nationality Law, 5712-1952, as well as
*

Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa, Israel. I wish to thank Adi Solomon,
research assistant, for her devoted assistance.
1
Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1950). The bill was published with an explanatory note in Hatza’ot Chok No. 48 of 12th Tammuz, 5710-1950, at 189.
2
Law of Return, supra note 1, § 1.
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the rights of an oleh under any other enactment, are also vested in a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the
spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the
spouse of a grandchild of a Jew, except for a person
who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his
religion.3
In the amendment to this law the right to immigrate to Israel was thus
granted to individuals who are non-Jews according to the religious
definition of a Jew in Orthodox Judaism: a non-Jewish child and
grandchild of a Jew, a spouse of a Jew, a spouse of a child of a Jew,
and a spouse of a grandchild of a Jew. The Israeli legislature also
stated that it “shall be immaterial whether or not a Jew by whose
right a right under subsection (a) is claimed is still alive and whether
or not he has immigrated to Israel.”4
One of the major purposes of this legislation was:
[t]o enable Jews that were married in mixed-marriage
to immigrate to Israel together with their non-Jew
family members, for otherwise those Jews would have
not immigrated at all. Mixed-marriage is a very widespread phenomenon among Jews in the Diaspora and
there is a fear that deprivation of rights from the nonJew family member of a Jew will result in the decision
of Jews not to immigrate to Israel.5
The aim of section 4A of the Law of Return is “to create an easier reality for mixed families who wish to immigrate to Israel as a whole
family unit,”6 and this is done:
in an attempt not to split [the family] and in a desire to
encourage its immigration to Israel, . . . to provide assistance to those who wish to fulfill the [two] main
purpose[s] of the Law of Return: . . . that every Jew is
entitled to immigrate to Israel, and that indeed Jews
will immigrate to Israel. [The purpose of this law is]
to encourage Jews that live outside the boundaries of
3

Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 24 LSI 28, § 4A(a) (1969–70).
Id. § 4A(b).
5
HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. The Minister of Interior [1997] IsrSC 53(2) 728, 755; see also
HCJ 8030/03 Smoilov v. The Minister of Interior [2004] IsrSC 58(6) 115, 120.
6
HCJ 265/87 Beresford v. The Minister of Interior [1987] IsrSC 43(4) 793, 834.
4
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Israel to immigrate to this state and to enable them as
much as possible to immigrate to Israel.7
Immigrants to Israel in light of a right granted to them in the Law of
Return are also granted the right to be citizens of this state in the Nationality Law. Section 2 of this law, in particular, grants a person
who immigrated to Israel as a result of a right granted to him or her in
the Law of Return an automatic right to obtain Israeli citizenship.8
In contrast to the easy path of this individual to Israeli citizenship, the path of those who did not immigrate to Israel as a result of a
right granted to them in the Law of Return, and wish to acquire Israeli citizenship by naturalization, is difficult, due to the Minister of Interior’s discretion regarding the naturalization process.9
A new immigration policy has been in effect in Israel as a result of the outbreak of violence between Palestinians and Jews in
September 5761-2000. At that time, the issuing of residency permits
to Palestinian spouses of Israeli citizens was effectively frozen. This
de facto suspension policy was ratified by the Israeli cabinet in May
2002. The policy of a ban on family unification for IsraeliPalestinian couples was introduced by an administrative decision of
the Ministry of Interior in 5762-2002, and enacted into law in 57632003 by the Israeli House of Representatives (the Knesset) as a result
of concerns about the security of the State of Israel and its citizens
stemming from terrorist attacks of Palestinians residing in the occupied territories—the West Bank and Gaza—against Israeli citizens.10
The Citizenship and Entry Into Israel Law imposed significant restrictions upon Palestinians from these territories who sought to obtain Israeli citizenship and the right to be residents of Israel. It barred
family reunification of non-Israeli Palestinians who were married to
7

Stamka, IsrSC 53(2) at 755.
See Nationality Law, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50, § 2(a) (1951–52).
9
See Albert K. Wan, Note, Israel’s Conflicted Existence as a Jewish Democratic State:
Striking the Proper Balance Under the Citizenship and Entry Into Israel Law, 29 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 1345, 1351–52 (2004). The gradual process of obtaining Israeli citizenship by naturalization designed for spouses of Israeli citizens and residents was defined as a result of the
ruling of the High Court of Justice in the Stamka case, and first detailed in the 1996 policy of
the State of Israel’s response in HCJ 338/99 Issa v. The Minister of Interior [IsrSC -10
march 1999] (unpublished decision). Eventually, as a result of this ruling, the guidelines of
the Ministry of Interior in 1999 became more flexible. They were evaluated in the subsequent case of the Supreme Court of Israel, HCJ 7139/02 Abas-Batzah v. The Minister of Interior [2003] IsrSC 57 (3), 481–94.
10
Daphne Barak-Erez, Israel: Citizenship and Immigration Law in the Vise of Security,
Nationality, and Human Rights, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 184, 185 (2008).
8
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Israeli citizens, especially of Palestinian origin, living in Israel.11
II.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE IMMIGRATION POLICY OF ISRAEL

Israel was defined in its Basic Laws as a “Jewish and democratic state.”12 It is not easy to reconcile the concepts “Jewish” and
“democratic” when we analyze the immigration policy of Israel. On
the one hand, Israel was established in order to gather all the Jews
from the exile to the Jewish state. On the other hand, Israel, as a
democratic state, declared in its proclamation of independence that it
is obliged to maintain equal human rights without distinction between
individuals based upon their race, color, or national origin.13 Is the
immigration policy of Israel justified in a “Jewish and democratic
state”?
The immigration policy of Israel is sometimes criticized as
being racist, discriminatory, or undemocratic.14 Sometimes Palestinians claim they should be granted the right to immigrate to Israel, their
“homeland,” as a result of a right granted to them in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.15 This is a United Nations
treaty entered into force on March 23, 1976. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights currently has 162 states parties, including Israel.16 This Covenant grants individuals protection against
discrimination. Article 12(4) states: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.” Article 26 states: “All
persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.” These articles could be a
basis for the claim by some Palestinians that Israel, in the Law of Return, arbitrarily deprives them of their right to enter their “own coun11

Citizenship and Entry Into Israel (Temporary Order) Law, 5763-2003, available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/citizenship_law.htm (unofficial translation).
12
See, e.g., Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994, S.H. 90, § 2.
13
Wan, supra note 9, at 1345–46; see also DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL (Isr. 1948).
14
See Raef Zreik, Notes on the Value of Theory: Readings in the Law of Return—A Polemic, 2 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 34-42 (2008) (considering whether “[p]olitics means
that there is [a] group of people which has some common characteristic, be it national, ethnic, religious, or any other, and which is willing to defend its way of life as a group and even
ready to go to war for that reason”).
15
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
16
Office of the United Nations High Comm’r, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties 6 (July 14, 2006), available at http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/status.pdf

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/20

4

Kaplan: Immigration Policy in Israel

2015

IMMIGRATION POLICY IN ISRAEL

1093

try” and discriminates against them.
Sometimes the claim of Palestinians who wish to immigrate
to Israel is based upon the right to family life.17 This right has been
recognized in international law and is mentioned in important international treaties, such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights18
and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 19 Article
10(1) of the second Covenant states: “The widest possible protection
and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural
and fundamental group unit of society.”20 In addition, other international treaties recognize the essential and central role of the family in
human society.21 International law protects the family in special circumstances such as by granting immigration rights to family members.22 A foreign spouse, married to a citizen or permanent resident
in Israel, can claim he or she should be granted the right to immigrate
to Israel in light of the principles of international law.
However, the foundation of the immigration policy of Israel is
not “arbitrary” discrimination. It could be justified in light of the
unique circumstances of Jewish self-determination in a Jewish state.
The proponents of the current immigration policy in Israel provide
several justifications for this policy.
The scholar Ruth Gavison rejects the claim that the Law of
Return is a clear case of racism against Arab citizens in Israel. 23 She
explains that all nations have the right to self-determination in their
own country. The principle of return of an ethnic group as a means
of enhancing the self-determination of that group is a common practice in many states. Since the Law of Return enables the Jewish people to realize their right of self-determination, it can be justified.
Gavison also notes that the existence of the Jewish state—established
as a solution to the persecution and distress of Jews as defenseless
foreigners in the Diaspora—is very significant in the lives of Jews in
17

HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of Interior [2006] 2 TakEI 1754.
ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 23(1) (“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit
of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”).
19
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 10(1), G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), at 49, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316, opened for signature Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter ICESCR].
20
Id.
21
See Yuval Merin, The Right of Family Life and Civil Marriage Under International
Law and its Implementation in the State of Israel, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 79, 80 n.2
(2005).
22
Id. at 80.
23
Ruth Gavison, The Jews’ Right to Statehood: A Defense, 15 AZURE 70, 95–96 (2003).
18
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Israel and outside its boundaries.24 From the point of view of many
Jews, the loss of the Jewish state means an end to all the great advantages they derive from its presence. Because there is no realistic
alternative to the current and unique Jewish state, the advantages resulting from the existence of this state cannot be replaced by similar
advantages in another state. Therefore, Israel has the right to preserve and to nurture its Jewish identity through, inter alia, its immigration policy.
The scholar Asa Kasher believes that if a national group has
been deprived in the past of the conditions that would have enabled it
to realize its right of self-determination, it ought to now be permitted
to become a majority in a given territory, thus attaining the conditions
necessary for its self-determination. Kasher believes that because
Jews have suffered throughout history from harsh persecutions and
prejudice as a minority group, it is legitimate to establish an immigration policy that discriminates in favor of Jews in Israel. This state is
their homeland, and an immigration policy of positive discrimination
in favor of Jews in Israel maintains their current status as a majority
group in the Jewish state. He justifies this policy of Israel in light of
the unique circumstances of Jewish history and survival calling for a
special policy of affirmative action.25 Some take into consideration
the outlook of this scholar as one of the justifications of the immigration policy of Israel.26
In addition, a justification for the immigration policy of Israel
stems from the right to benefit from the advantages of a unique culture. As scholars Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal explained,
the right to culture “stems from the fact that every person has an
overriding interest in his personality identity—that is, in preserving
his way of life and the traits that are central identity components for
him and the other members of his cultural group.”27 From a liberal
point of view, the right to culture is important since it facilitates autonomy. When the right of culture is granted to an individual, more
24

Id. at 76–77.
See generally Asa Kasher, Justice and Affirmative Action: Naturalization and the Law
of Return, 15 ISR.Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 101 (1985); see also CHAIM GANS, THE LIMITS OF
NATIONALISM 126–27 (2003); Aviad Bakshi, Does a State Have a Primary Obligation to
Accept Immigrants?, 10 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 387 (2006).
26
See NA’AMA CARMI, THE LAW OF RETURN: IMMIGRATION RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS 35–
55 (2003).
27
Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to Culture, 61 SOC. RES.
491, 505 (1994).
25
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options are available:
Only through being socialized in a culture can one tap
the options which give life a meaning. By and large
one’s cultural membership determines the horizon of
one’s opportunities, of what one may become, or (if
one is older) what one might have been. Little surprise that it is in the interest of every person to be fully
integrated in a cultural group. Equally plain is the importance to its members of the prosperity, cultural and
material, of their cultural group. Its prosperity contributes to the richness and variety of the opportunities
the culture provides access to.28
Many countries develop the values, tradition, and language of
a dominant culture. It is not easy, and sometimes impossible, for
countries whose populations speak different languages and belong to
different cultures to implement a policy of equality and neutrality
concerning culture—and it is not clear that from a liberal point of
view these countries should attempt to realize this agenda.29 It is difficult for states with special populations, like the State of Israel, to be
culturally neutral, and this fact might indicate that the achievement of
the ideal of cultural equality is not a realistic goal in certain states,
especially states such as Israel that wish to preserve and develop the
unique culture of the dominant group in the population. Therefore,
Jewish culture is and should be the dominant culture in Israel.
Chaim Gans held that the Law of Return—or at least a weakened version of it which grants some priority to Jews in immigration
to Israel in order to preserve the Jewish character of the state—is a
legitimate means for cultural preservation.30 The justification of nationality-based priorities in immigration to states such as the State of
Israel derives from interests that individual human beings, such as the
Jews in Israel, have in their own existence and self-determination.31
28

JOSEPH RAZ, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 170, 177 (rev. ed. 1995).
29
Will Kymlicka, Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, in
CAN LIBERAL P LURALISM BE EXPORTED?: WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY AND ETHNIC
RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE 13, 16–21 (Will Kymlicka & Magda Opalski eds., 2001).
30
Chaim Gans, Individuals’ Interest in the Preservation of Their Culture: Its Meaning,
Justifications, and Implications, 1 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 6-16 (2007) .
31
Chaim Gans, Nationalist Priorities and Restrictions in Immigration: The Case of Israel,
2 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. Vol. 2, Iss. 1, Art. 12,1,5-6 (2008); CHAIM GANS, FROM RICHARD
WAGNER TO THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT OF RETURN: PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF ISRAELI
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The preservation of the right to culture could be the foundation, from
a liberal perspective, of the current immigration policy of the homeland of the Jews. Muslims, Christians, and other believers could survive and flourish in many states that preserve their values, culture,
and religion; Jews do not have an alternative to the Jewish state.
The scholar Na’ama Carmi also believes that the preservation
of the Jewish majority’s culture could be an appropriate basis for the
immigration policy of Israel. Although she is aware of the fact that
“demographic considerations” could be associated with racism, she
believes that it is not clear they are always illegitimate since sometimes they “have a strong and relative connection to the legitimate interest in preserving culture.”32
In addition, the immigration to Israel of many individuals that
do not share the values and religion of the Jewish majority could be
counterproductive. Solidarity is important in all societies—including
the society of a Jewish and democratic state.33 According to this argument, an essential foundation of a stable society is a strong mutual
goal embodied in a social contract of its members. When there is a
mutual goal, there is also a sense of solidarity among members of the
society. This foundation produces the willingness of many members
of the society to act for the common good. When there is less harmony and unity in a society, it is less likely this society will remain a
unified group for many years. The mutual foundation of the social
contract in a Jewish state is the preservation of the principles, lifestyle, and outlook of Judaism. Consequently, a Jewish and democratic state could impose limits upon immigration and establish an immigration policy that encourages immigration of Jews and their relatives
to Israel, since this act will enhance solidarity in the society in Israel.
It is not so easy to justify the immigration policy in the Citizenship and Entry Into Israel Law. This law goes one step beyond
the previously existing rules of immigration in Israel. In the past, the
immigration policy of Israel was based upon granting preference to
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 205-10 (Am Oved, Tel Aviv, 2006).
32
Na’ama Carmi, Immigration Policy: Between Demographic Considerations and
Preservation of Culture, 2 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 29 (2008). See also CARMI, supra
note 26, at 48. While Carmi believes that each person has a universal right to immigrate to
other countries and the state should provide strong arguments in order to prevent the immigration of individuals across its boundaries, she is sympathetic to the argument favoring Israel’s immigration policy based upon preservation and development of the culture of the majority in Israel at present.
33
CARMI, supra note 26, at 58.
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Jewish immigrants and their relatives and spouses over immigrants
from all other groups. The new law specifically singles out a group
of Palestinians for exclusion.
Israeli authorities have sought to justify the immigration policy in the Citizenship and Entry Into Israel Law on security grounds.
The security consideration was raised in the explanatory text accompanying this law when it was first proposed. The State claimed that
Palestinians from the occupied territories have been involved in security-related offenses; therefore, the enactment of this new law is required as a means to prevent terrorist attacks. According to thenIsraeli government minister Gideon Ezra, there have been many lethal attacks in the last few years involving Palestinians who entered
Israel from the occupied territories.34
However, some claim that this law was enacted in an attempt
to reduce the percentage of Israeli Arabs among the population of Israel. The rules of this law were analyzed in the Adalah case.35 Adalah is a legal organization for the enhancement of Arab minority
rights in Israel. It challenged the constitutionality of this new Israeli
law in a petition to the High Court of Justice and sought to revoke it
as unconstitutional. It claimed that security considerations were not
the main motivation of the enactors of this law, but that the primary
motivation of those who enacted this law was demographic.
In his response to the petition of the Adalah organization, the
Attorney General of Israel claimed that since the beginning of security problems, in a period known as the “second intifada,” until the enactment of this law in 2003, Palestinians from the occupied territories
who received the status of legitimate residents in Israel as a result of
family unification were sometimes involved in facilitating terror attacks. The State of Israel claimed that there is a security imperative
to prevent the entry of residents of the occupied territories into Israel,
since their entry into Israel and their free movement within the state’s
borders after receiving Israeli documentation are liable to endanger
the peace and security of the citizens and residents of the state.36
The Supreme Court of Israel, by a vote of six to five, reached
the conclusion that this law is valid. One of the six Justices who
34

Joanne Mariner, Israel’s New Citizenship Law: A Separation Wall Through the Heart,
FINDLAW’S WRIT (Aug. 11, 2003), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20030811.html.
35
See HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of Interior [2006] 2 TakEI 1754 (unpublished)
(14.5.2006).
36
See Adalah, 2 TakEI 1754 (Feb. 2, 2006), Cheshin, D.C.J., ¶ 110.
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found the law was constitutional, Deputy Chief Justice Cheshin, explained that the Palestinians who are residents of the occupied territories constitute a risk group for the citizens and residents of Israel.37
Although this law was upheld, the gap between the majority and minority Justices in this decision was not wide, and some of the Justices
in the majority granted weight to the fact that this law was not a permanent enactment.
III.

WHO IS A JEW IN LEGISLATION ENCOURAGING
IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL?

There is a constant clash between two groups among the Jewish population in Israel, secular and religious Jews, in regard to the
appropriate interpretation of the concept “Jew” in the legislation that
grants these individuals the right to immigrate to Israel and receive
citizenship of this state. This is part of a broader dispute about the
Jewish character of the State of Israel. The Court is granted a right to
interpret the law of the Jewish state in legal decisions. However, this
interpretation engenders debate among the Judiciary and is an echo of
the secular-religious divide across the Jewish population in Israel. It
is hard to find an appropriate definition of a “Jew” in Israeli legislation since there is a significant gap in Israel between the perspectives
of religious Orthodox Jews and non-Orthodox Jews. Probably a dialogue between moderate Jewish spiritual leaders and the leaders of
secular Jews in Israel could bear good fruit. The Israeli courts have
been struggling with the definition of a Jew especially in the Law of
Return, since the establishment of the Jewish state imposed its own
agenda. The courts chose their own formula of balancing between
the outlook and feelings of the religious and secular segments of the
Jewish society in Israel, which was not based upon popular consensus
or dialogue.
A secular definition of a “Jew”—mentioned in the Law of Return—was adopted by the Supreme Court of Israel in the Rufeisen
case38 and developed further in the Shalit case.39 The specific issue in
Shalit was whether the minor children of a Jewish father and an agnostic mother of non-Jewish parentage could be registered in Israel’s
37

See id. ¶¶ 109-10.
HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. The Minister of Interior [1962] IsrSC 16(4) 2428; see also
Ralph Slovenco, Brother Daniel and Jewish Identity, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (1964).
39
HCJ 58/68 Shalit v.The Minister of Interior [1969] IsrSC 23(2) 477.
38
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population register as of Jewish nationality, in its secular/ethnic connotation, if the parents so desire. The father, the petitioner in this
case, demanded that his children be registered in the population register of Israel as Jewish although they are not defined as Jews under the
principles of Orthodox Judaism. He contested the refusal of the registration officer to register his children as being ethnically of Jewish
affiliation. A few of the Justices tried to avoid controversy by confining the focus in their decision to a narrow point: does the registrar
have the power to examine the correctness of the parents’ declaration
that a child is Jewish, and is he granted the right to refuse registration
if his examination of this matter leads him to doubt its correctness?
According to the outlook of these Justices, registration of an individual as a Jew is an act in the sphere of statistics and registration; therefore, a bona fide declaration by an individual that he or she, or his or
her children are Jewish is usually sufficient.40 The declaration establishes his or her identity as a “Jew.” However, this Court policy is
problematic, for if a person is actually not a Jew according to a “correct” definition, then the declaration that he is a Jew might not be in
good faith.41
The traditional religious definition of a Jew was not adopted
when laws concerning the return of Jews to Israel and citizenship in
this state were interpreted. This religious perspective, the traditional
criteria of Orthodox Judaism, is valid only when Rabbinical Courts in
Israel determine who is a Jew who is subjected to their jurisdiction.
The desire of the father in the Shalit case—that in Israel Jewish nationality need no longer be regarded as identical with religious affiliation—was fulfilled.42 Since the father of the children in this case was
Jewish and the mother born as Christian but not professing any religion, the entire family living in Israel and closely involved in the
Jewish society in this state, and the two parents, the guardians of
these children, desiring that they maintain this special bond with this
society, the Justices held that the children of the Shalit family should
be registered as Jews by nationality although their mother was not
Jewish and they did not convert to Judaism and therefore were not
Jews according to the Orthodox definition. The traditional criteria of
40

The foundation of the policy of the Supreme Court of Israel in this sphere is the decision of the Court, in a different context, in HCJ 143/62 Funk-Schlesinger v. Minister of Interior [1963] IsrSC 17(1) 225.
41
Cf. Benjamin Akzin, Who Is A Jew?: A Hard Case, 5 ISR. L. REV. 259, 259 (1970).
42
Id. at 262.
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Orthodox Judaism are valid only when Rabbinical courts in Israel determine who is a Jew in an attempt to define who are or are not Jews
subjected to their jurisdiction.43
After this decision, the Israeli legislature responded to the opposition of the religious segment of society to such a secular definition of a Jew and adopted a new definition of the concept “Jew” in
Amendment No. 2 to the Law of Return. This definition was the result of dialogue and compromise.44 According to section 4B of the
Law of Return as amended, Israeli citizenship is granted to any “Jew”
defined as an individual born to a Jewish mother, or a convert to the
Jewish faith, provided that this person is not affiliated with “another
religion.”45
This definition of a “Jew” is a compromise between two opposite outlooks.46 It is closer to the traditional Orthodox definition of
a Jew. However, the definition of the legislature is not identical to
the religious definition of a Jew. In current Orthodox Jewish law, a
Jew is a son or daughter of a Jewish mother. In addition, the conversion of a Jew to another religion is not valid.47 According to the principles of Jewish law, when a Jew converts to another religion he or
she is violating the commandments of Jewish law but does not become a member of another religion as a result of this act. However,
the Israeli legislature stated that a “Jew” in the Law of Return is not
“a member of another religion.”48 Another possible deviation from
the clear-cut Orthodox perspective is in the sphere of conversion to
Judaism. The legislature used the words “has become converted to
Judaism,”49 but did not mention the requirements concerning conversion. This was a decision not to decide about the standard of conversion. The desire of those who were insisting that the legislature state
explicitly that only the strict standard of conversion of Orthodox Judaism should be legitimate was not fulfilled. The option of a different standard of conversion to Judaism—performed by the Conservative or Reform movements—was not rejected.

43
44
45
46
47
48
49

See Shalev Ginossar, Who Is A Jew: A Better Law?, 5 ISR. L. REV. 264, 264–65 (1970).
Id. at 264.
Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), supra note 3, § 4B.
Ginossar, supra note 43, at 264–67.
See generally HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. The Minister of Interior [1962] IsrSC 16(4) 2428.
Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), supra note 3, § 4B.
Id.
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In Association of Torah Observant Sefardim-Tenuat Shas,50
the opinion of the majority of Justices of the Supreme Court was that
the requirements of Population Registry Law51 were fulfilled, for the
purpose of establishing conversion to Judaism of individuals in Jewish communities outside the boundaries of Israel, when the convert
made a statement that he or she was converted to the Jewish faith in a
Jewish community outside the territory of Israel. Since it is a matter
of registration, this statement and a document produced by the convert attesting that he or she was converted to Judaism are sufficient.
There is no distinction for the purpose of registering this conversion
among the conversions of the Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform
Movements in the Diaspora; the Orthodox standard of conversion is
not relevant when the policy of registration is determined. Only
when there is a solid factual basis leading to the suspicion of fraud on
the part of the individual who claims to have been converted can the
State refuse to register this individual in the population registry as a
Jew.52
However, in the Beresford case, a religious Justice of the Supreme Court, Menachem Elon, adopted a religious interpretation of
the definition of a “Jew” in section 3A(2) of the amended Population
Registry Law, which is the same as the definition of a “Jew” in section 4B of the Law of Return—i.e., a person “who was born of a Jewish mother, or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a
member of another religion.” His criteria for defining a “Jew” constituted a departure from the secular approach applied by the Court in
the Rufeisen and Shalit cases. According to his outlook, the definition of a “Jew” in the secular legislation of Israel is objectivenormative. He stated that the acceptance of this objective-normative
definition of a Jew in the legal system of the Jewish state, including
adherence to the Orthodox pattern of conversion in Jewish law, could
ensure the unity of the Jewish nation with an agreed standard of Jewish identity.53 However, the majority of the Justices in Beresford did
not share this point of view. Justice Aharon Barak stated he could
not accept the criteria used by Justice Elon for defining Jewish identi50
HCJ 264/87 Ass’n of Torah Observant Sefardim-Tenuat Shas v. Dir. of Population Registry [1989] IsrSC 33(2) 723.
51
Population Registry Law, 5725-1965, 19 LSI 288 (1964–65).
52
The foundation of this policy, in addition to the abovementioned Funk-Schlesinger
case, HCJ 143/62 Funk-Schlesinger v. Minister of Interior [1963] IsrSC 17(1) 225, is the
Miller case. See HCJ 230/86 Miller v. Minister of Interior [1986] IsrSC 40(4) 436.
53
HCJ 265/87 Beresford v. Minister of Interior [1989] IsrSC 43(4) 793, 812.
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ty for secular legal purposes, such as those related to the Law of Return. He held that the traditional criteria were static and would not
admit any change in the future; Barak preferred the secular approach
adopted in the Rufeisen case since according to his point of view it
had a more dynamic nature and was capable of undergoing changes
in the course of time.54 This secular definition relies on the fact that
an individual, defined as a “Jew,” identifies with the culture of the
Jewish majority in Israel.
IV.

CONVERSION OF IMMIGRANTS: THE POLICY OF THE STATE

The conversion of individuals who identify with the Jewish
majority is a final stage in the process of increasing that majority in
Israel, also in the religious sphere, in an era of military conflict between Israel and enemies from the surrounding population. It is the
mission of the Jewish state to add more members to the Jewish majority in Israel in an attempt to enhance solidarity within the state. In
addition, having a distinct majority of Jews in Israel is essential in
order for the state to maintain and strengthen solidarity with the Jews
in the Diaspora.55 This solidarity is important for Israel since the
Jews in the Diaspora make a significant contribution to Israel in the
political and financial spheres.
The scholar Asher Cohen wrote that in the year 5768-2008,
approximately 320,000 individuals reside in Israel who are not considered Jews under religious law, and 5,000 more join this group each
year.56 Most of the members of this group came to Israel in mass migration from the former Socialist Republics of the Soviet Union, as a
result of a right granted to them in the Law of Return. Many are descendants of Jews. They have a Jewish father and a non-Jewish
mother, or are grandchildren of a Jewish grandfather. Some are
spouses of Jews.
In spite of the fact that this is a large group of individuals who
54

Id. at 825–28.
See Israel Inst. for Democracy, Israel Towards a Constitutional Democracy: The Relationship Between State and Religion, http://www.idi.org.il/ResearchAndPrograms/Public_
Council/Pages/Public_council_1_i.aspx.
56
Asher Cohen, The Conversion Challenge, 313 NEKUDAH 31, 32 (2008). The special
courts for conversion in Israel provide conversion services only to immigrants who immigrated to Israel legally. They do not convert illegal immigrants. See HCJ 552/04 Guzman v.
The Minister of Interior [IsrSC July 3, 2005] (unpublished decision); HCJ 8811/07 Kintart v.
The Minister of Interior [IsrSC Mar. 24, 2008] (unpublished decision); HCJ 4278/08 Yurko
v. The Minister of Interior [IsrSC Feb. 2, 2009] (unpublished decision).
55
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at present identify with the Jewish nation, there are fewer than 2,000
conversions to Judaism in Israel each year.57 According to Cohen,
many of the non-Jews who live in Israel and belong to this group
identify with the political goals of the Jewish state, and are assimilating into the secular Israeli society in the social sphere. Cohen believes this is a social conversion to Judaism without the religious
component of accepting the doctrine of the religious principles of the
Jewish faith.58 During the process of social conversion, the members
of this group become members of the Jewish society in Israel, learn
the Hebrew language, are educated in the Israeli educational system,
serve in the Israeli Defense Forces, and adopt the behavioral and cultural patterns of the secular Jewish society in Israel without a religious act of conversion. Cohen argues that this reality—of a social
conversion without a religious conversion—is not desirable. A significant group of immigrants in Israeli society live in a vaguely problematic situation. Sociologically they belong to the Jewish group, but
Jewish law and the religious establishment in Israel define the members of this group as non-Jews. In addition, this reality does not enhance solidarity among members of the Jewish community in Israel.
Cohen argues that the State of Israel should intervene in an attempt to assist members of this group who wish to join the Jewish
faith. The State of Israel and the Israeli society should help this
group of immigrants and their relatives, children, and spouses to assimilate in Israeli Jewish society by encouraging a more lenient conversion process. Cohen sees the conversion of members of this group
as a national challenge and not simply a personal matter for those
who wish to convert in a Rabbinical court. He explains that the adoption of the strict approach to conversions in Rabbinical courts in Israel will be an obstacle for those who wish to realize the Zionist dream
of joining and maintaining the Jewish majority in Israel. It will cause
the rejection of more and more applications of non-Jewish immigrants who wish to convert and also join the Jewish society in the religious sphere. By encouraging the Rabbis and Rabbinical courts in
Israel to adopt a more lenient approach towards conversion, the State
of Israel can fulfill the purpose of its establishment—to implement
the Zionist outlook in reality.59
57

Cohen, supra note 56, at 32.
Id. at 33.
59
Asher Cohen, Israeli Assimilation: Between Proselytizing by Halakha, “Social Conversion” and “Secular” Conversion, 14 TZOHAR 117, 121 (2003).
58
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The State of Israel encouraged the establishment of special
Rabbinical Courts for conversion that assist candidates for conversion
and fund their activity. Most of these candidates are immigrants to
Israel and their children who are citizens of the state and wish to convert and as a result be part of the Jewish majority in the religious
sphere. Many in this group of non-Jewish immigrants already identify with the national and political agenda of the Jewish majority in Israel. When they convert to Judaism, they also accept the ideology of
the Jewish religion. The new religious identity of the converts grants
them more autonomy and an elevated social status. Without conversion, when these individuals are part of a minority culture in Israel,
“the options and opportunities open to its members will shrink, become less attractive, and their pursuit less likely to be successful.”60
A lenient policy regarding the conversion of these immigrants
and their descendants also promotes their rights in the spheres of human dignity and liberty, rights whose normative status in Israel was
elevated with the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty.61 The immigrants who wish to convert to Judaism believe
that conversion will help them realize their dream to be part of the
Jewish majority in Israel. After their conversion, they will be fully
integrated into Jewish society. They will be treated by members of
the Jewish majority as fellow Jews, and their new status could enable
them and their descendants to marry Jews in Israel. Some of them
feel they are part of the Jewish nation since their ancestors were Jewish, and some believe in the ideology of the Jewish religion and wish
to observe the commandments of Jewish law. According to their perspective, conversion to Judaism is a contribution to their human dignity. For them and others in Israel, the special significance of the
constitutional right to human dignity is, among other things, “the
ability of a human being . . . to express his desires and choose paths
for their fulfillment . . . to receive fair treatment by each authority and
by each individual.”62
Rabbinical courts should find out if a candidate for conversion is sincere. However, a lenient approach when a candidate for
conversion comes before the Rabbinical courts is preferable because
it enhances the liberty of the convert. The meaning of the right to
60
JOSEPH RAZ, National Self-Determination, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note
28, at 125, 134 (with Avishai Margalit).
61
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, 45 LSI 150 (1992).
62
Meir Shamgar, Human Dignity and Violence, 3 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 33, 40–41 (1995).
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liberty in this basic law is “the free will of the individual. The right
to human dignity is the right of free choice granted to an individual
that enables him or her to develop his or her personality and to make
decisions that shape his or her destiny.”63 As the Court held in
Nachmani v. Nachmani, “Liberty in its full sense is not only the freedom from external intervention of the authorities or others. It includes the ability of an individual to choose the direction of his own
course of life, to fulfill his basic desires and to use discretion that enables him or her to make a choice from a range of possible choices.”64 Isaiah Berlin explained that the “positive” meaning of the
word liberty stems from the desire of an individual to be the master
of his own fate. He or she desires to be able to execute his or her
own voluntary actions and not be subjected to the will of other individuals. The individual wants to be a subject, not an object.65
When an individual converts, he or she decides voluntarily to
become dependent. Conversion is a free choice to be subjected to the
commandments of Jewish law:
The American notion of freedom requires independence. . . . The right of independence—for individual as
well as nation—is essentially alien to the Jewish perspective. . . . Freedom to an American denotes a right.
Freedom to a Jew refers mainly to a power. . . . Judaism’s denigration of rights in the characterization of its
conception of freedom is a direct consequence of its
over-arching concern with duties or obligations. . . .
Judaism’s paramount concern is with imposition of
obligations, i.e., mitzvot. Their commanding authority
derives either from the rightness of the act prescribed
by the imperative (which should be construed in religious terms as the expression of the Divine will) or
from the rightness of the act together with the fact of
commitment.66
Converts are “adults, exercising free will, who will immediately as-

63

AHARON BARAK, 3 INTERPRETATION IN LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 426
(1994).
64
CA 2401/95 Nachmani v. Nachmani [1996] IsrSC 50(4) 661, 682–83.
65
ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166, 178 (Henry Hardy ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
66
Sol Roth, Two Concepts of Freedom, 13 TRADITION 59, 61–64 (1972–73).
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sume their role as Jews.”67
Indeed, the establishment of courts for conversion funded by
the State of Israel is certainly not in the spirit of the idea of separation
of church and state. This separation stems from a viewpoint that a religious conviction is a personal matter which should be left free from
state interference. However, in the unique legal system of Israel, a
Jewish state, there is no separation between state and religion. Ruth
Gavison justifies the current interaction between law and religion in
the Jewish state by first noting that religion is important in the history
of many nations. Those who regard religion as a private matter ignore this fact, which is evident after a deep analysis of history.
Moreover, the role of religion and the perspective of the religious
population are very important in Israeli politics. Israel is defined in
its declaration of independence as a Jewish state and, as a result of
this definition, the adoption of a policy of separation between the
Jewish religion and the state in Israel is problematic.68 In Israel, a
Jewish state, we should take into consideration the perspective of Judaism. The Jewish religion is a collective-communal religion, and
the religious and national identities of Jews are identical. The definition of the Jewish collective in religious law is identical to the national identity of this collective. A separation between the state and religion in Israel is also contrary to the vision of the Zionist movement
that the State of Israel, as the homeland of the Jews, will solve the
problems the Jews encounter when they are a minority in the Diaspora.
V.

CONVERSION OF IMMIGRANTS: THE POLICY OF THE
RABBINICAL COURTS

The Rabbinical courts for conversion in Israel have adopted a
lenient approach in Jewish law. This policy, in favor of conversion,
is an attempt to assist, as much as possible, candidates for conversion,
who are usually immigrants to Israel or their children. The special
courts’ more lenient approach to conversion enables immigrants and
their children to more easily join a desirable religion. Nevertheless,
conservative elements in the Rabbinate and a group of Jewish judges
67

Jerry Hochbaum, Who is a Jew: A Sociological Perspective, 13 TRADITION 35, 39
(1972–73).
68
Ruth Gavison, Religion and State: Separation and Privatization, 2 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL
55, 56–57 (1994).
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in the regular Rabbinical courts in Israel oppose this lenient policy.
The debate between the lenient and strict Rabbis concerning
the conversion policy in Jewish law is ancient. All agree that Jewish
law encourages Jews to love sincere and pious converts. An important commandment in the Bible—“And you shall love the foreigner”69—imposes an obligation upon Jews to treat friends and foreigners in the same manner. Foreigners, including converts to
Judaism, should feel that the foundation of their relationship with
Jews is the love of Jews for them. The Bible stresses, many times,70
that Jews should love foreigners. In addition to the positive commandment to love the foreigner, there is a negative commandment
not to insult or shame the foreigner.71 Ancient Jewish scholars have
emphasized that many times—thirty-six times according to one opinion and forty-six times according to another—Biblical law prohibited
acts that offend or shame foreigners.72 This is part of a general perspective that love among all human beings is a basic foundation of
Jewish law.73
In the medieval period, Maimonides, an important medieval
Jewish scholar, in his codification of Jewish law Mishneh Torah,
places the directive that Jews should love foreigners who converted
to Judaism between two principles of Jewish law:74 one, that a person should love other individuals as he loves himself,75 and the other:
“Do not hate your brother in your heart.”76 He explains, “Loving the
foreigner who enters the wings of the Divine Presence comprises two
good acts: one, since he is actually a friend, and the other, since he is
a foreigner, and the Torah states that ‘you shall love the foreigner.’
”77 He adds that the two commandments coincide. One commandment is the directive: “And you shall love your G-od.”78 But Jews
should also love foreigners since G-od Almighty loves them, as stated in the holy ancient text.79
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Deuteronomy 10:19.
See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Metzia 59B.
Exodus 22:20.
See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Metzia 59B.
See Leviticus 19:17.
See MISHNEH TORAH, Deot 6:4–6.
Leviticus 19:18.
Id. 19:17.
MISHNEH TORAH, Deot 6:4 (quoting Deuteronomy 10:19).
See Deuteronomy 6:5; 11:1.
See id. 10:18.
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For Maimonides, this was practice and not mere theory. In
his responsa he adopted a generous approach to a foreigner who
joined the Jewish nation and accepted the commandments of the Jewish faith, the convert Ovadia.80 Maimonides emphasized that there is
a special duty to love this foreigner—“who left his father, his homeland and the powerful kingdom of his nation, and understood . . . that
their religion [of the Jews] is a religion of truth and justice . . . and
entered the wings of the Divine Presence and accepted the principles
of [the law of] Moses, the leader of all the prophets, and his desire
was to follow his commandments.”81 He addressed indirectly the
problem of the contradiction between two approaches in ancient Jewish texts in regard to the prayer of the convert that could cause
shame,82 and preferred the outlook in these texts that prevents possible unpleasantness and shame to foreigners who joined the Jewish
faith. In his responsa to Ovadia the convert, Maimonides wrote that
this convert could use the regular language in the prayer of all Jews:
“the G-od of our ancestors.” This sensitive policy will prevent possible shame to him. A different prayer for this convert, if he should recite it in the presence of his fellow Jews, could reveal that he converted to Judaism and is not a descendant of the Jewish nation’s
ancestors. Maimonides explained his preference as justified since:
Abraham taught all people . . . the religion of truth and
about the uniqueness of G-od, and fought against idolatry and . . . commanded his sons and the members of
his family to observe [the commandments to those
who follow] G-od’s path. . . . [T]herefore, whoever
converts to Judaism until the last generation and believes that G-od [of the Jews], mentioned in the Bible,
is the only [true G-od] is a follower of Abraham, may
he rest in peace, and one of the members of his family.
. . . As he [Abraham] reformed the individuals of his
80

Regarding the identity of the convert, see MENACHEM FINKELSTEIN, PROSELYTISM:
HALAKHAH AND PRACTICE 15 n.8 (1994).
81
Responsa Maimonides 2:448; see also id. 2:293.
82
In ancient sources, from the Tanaitic period, it is written explicitly that a foreigner cannot say a prayer which includes the words “our ancestors.” MISHNAH, Bikurim 1:4;
TOSEFTA, Bikurim 1:2. However, the subsequent Amoraic literature mentions the opinion of
Rabbi Judah, according to which a foreigner can say a prayer which includes these words,
since Abraham was a father of many gentiles. JERUSALEM TALMUD, Bikurim 1:4. The interpretation of Maimonides in this case is an adoption of the opinion in the Jerusalem Talmud
and rejection of the principle in Tanaitic literature.
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generation through his teaching . . . [he] is the father
of his descendants, which follow him, and the father
of all of his followers and whoever converts to Judaism. Therefore, you can say: “Our G-od and the G-od
of our ancestors,” for Abraham, may he rest in peace,
is your father.83
Although Maimonides mentioned other requirements for a
valid conversion including circumcision and immersion,84 it is evident that one of the basic elements of conversion is the acceptance of
the religious tenets of Judaism and the principles of Jewish law. According to Maimonides, conversion is an outcome of a sincere spiritual revolution in the soul of the convert, who pursued “G-od” and
“entered the wings of the Divine Presence” and accepted the directive
of “Moses, the Rabbi of all the prophets.”85 In order to accomplish
the spiritual conversion in the foreigner’s soul, the Rabbinical court
should first tell the candidate what are the “basic [foundations] of the
[Jewish] religion, which are monotheism and the prohibition of idolatry[,] and it should prolong the focus upon this matter.”86
The convert should adopt a new religious ideology and also
join the Jewish nation. The convert cannot perform only the religious
act; the conversion is also not valid when the convert only joins the
Jewish nation but does not accept the obligation to observe the Jewish commandments.87 Both the spiritual and national requirements
should be fulfilled when a foreigner desires to convert to Judaism.88
83

Responsa Maimonides 2:293.
MISHNEH TORAH, Issurei Bi’ah 13:4 (“[W]hen the gentile wants to join the alliance [of
Jews], to enter the wings of the Divine Presence and to take upon himself the burden of the
Torah, he has to perform the acts of circumcision [and] immersion.”).
85
Responsa Maimonides 2:293.
86
MISHNEH TORAH, Issurei Bi’ah 14:2.
87
ISAAC HALEVY HERZOG, The Rights of Minorities According to the Halakhah, in 2
TECHUMIN 169, 170 n.1 (1971), A CONSTITUTION FOR ISRAEL ACCORDING TO THE TORAH 12,
13 n.1 (1989) (“Acceptance of the Jewish national outlook which includes the faith that the
people of Israel will return to their homeland and will reestablish Jewish sovereignty there is
part of the Jewish belief, and the convert should adopt all the elements of this spiritual outlook. . . . [A] foreigner who adopts the religious aspects of Judaism but has reservations
about the acceptance of the national aspect of Judaism, which is a belief that the Jewish nation will return to Zion and reestablish in this land the Jewish kingdom, cannot be accepted
as a convert to Judaism since the belief in these principles is a fundamental element in a Jewish outlook.”).
88
See id. 2 TECHUMIN 170 n.1, A CONSTITUTION FOR ISRAEL ACCORDING TO THE TORAH 13
n.1 (“When an individual did not accept the principles of the Jewish religion in a manner
required in the rules pertaining to conversion—although he decided to be devoted with all of
84
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Another concern of scholars of Jewish law, especially in recent generations, is whether the qualifications of the Dayanim in the
Rabbinical court are adequate. One of the major flaws of a conversion occurs when the court does not have the required qualifications.89 Orthodox Jewish law scholars frequently claim that conversions performed by courts of the Conservative and Reform
movements are not valid. The outlook of the spiritual leaders of
these movements concerning theological matters and their perspective in regard to the minimal standard of obligation to observe the
Jewish commandments are not considered adequate.90
Especially in recent generations the question of a convert’s ulterior motive has been scrutinized. The main problem in this context
is marriage-motivated conversions. Scholars have questioned the validity of these conversions when the observance of the commandments of Jewish law is not the goal of the convert. What is a desirable policy for the Jewish court when it is evident that the candidate
for conversion will not observe the commandments of Jewish law or
will do so only partially? Sometimes when a Jewish spouse is cohabiting with a non-Jew, or might cohabit with him or her in the future,
regardless of the prohibition of this behavior in Jewish law, a Rabbinical court may adopt a more lenient policy towards the conversion of
the spouse in an attempt to avoid this serious transgression of the
principles of Jewish law.91 When the convert accepts an obligation to
observe all the Jewish commandments in an Orthodox court, although
it was a conversion motivated by desire to marry a Jewish spouse, it
is a valid conversion and all the rules pertaining to converts, including those that prohibit a Jew from shaming him or her, still apply.
Should this policy prevail when Jewish scholars or another

his spirit and soul to the Jewish nation and to fulfill all the civil duties of members of this
nation—he or she remains in the status of a gentile according to the principles of Jewish law,
and cannot marry a Jewish spouse.”).
89
A private conversion is not valid. The act of conversion should be performed in the
presence of three Jewish judges (Dayanim) in a Jewish court. BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
Yebamot 47A. The Tosaphists explained that these judges should be present when the convert accepts the burden of the commandments of Jewish law. It is preferable that the ritual
immersion also be performed in the presence of these judges. However, if they are not present, this act is de facto valid. Id.; see also the view of Rabbi Meir Posner in Responsa Beit
Meir 65.
90
Responsa Achiezer 3:26; RESPONSA IGROT MOSHEH, Yoreh Deah 1:160; Yoreh Deah
2:123; 125.
91
RESPONSA IGROT MOSHEH, Yoreh Deah 2:124; see also Shmuel Shilo, Halakhic Leniency in Modern Responsa Regarding Conversion, 22 ISR. L. REV. 353 (1987–88).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/20

22

Kaplan: Immigration Policy in Israel

2015

IMMIGRATION POLICY IN ISRAEL

1111

court find out, after the conversion, that the behavior of the convert is
not the behavior of an observant Jew? This issue was addressed in
two significant decisions of the High Rabbinical Court in Israel in the
last decade. These decisions determine the fate of many past conversions of immigrants to Israel. In these decisions the Judges in Rabbinical courts (Dayanim) analyzed the significance of the converts’
religious outlook and behavior in the period after their conversion
and focused especially upon the issue of partial observance of the
principles of Jewish law after the conversion. Could a regular Rabbinical court decide, in light of the behavior of the convert after his or
her conversion, to invalidate the conversion by the previous court? In
both cases, it was not clear that the immigrant, who took upon himself or herself an obligation to observe the commandments of Jewish
law before the court, actually adopted a religious outlook and observed the positive and negative commandments of Judaism after the
conversion. Many immigrants who converted to Judaism are not
married to observant spouses and consequently it is not easy for them
to observe all the commandments of Jewish law after their conversion.
Sensitivity and empathy to the converts and immigrants to Israel, and an attempt to avoid the undesirable consequences of a strict
religious approach, are evident in the first decision, handed down in
5761-2001.92 The decision of the majority in this case was written by
the Jewish judge (Dayan) Rabbi Shlomo Daikhovsky, who was
joined by the Jewish judge Rabbi Ezra Bar Shalom. This case was an
appeal on the judgment of the Dayan Izirer of the regional Rabbinical
Court in Rechovot concerning the validity of a woman’s conversion
in a Rabbinical court. The Dayan Izirer emphasized that according to
her declaration in his court, at the time of her conversion to Judaism
she knew that she could not observe all the commandments of Jewish
law, and her commitment before the court to observe the principles of
Jewish law was actually limited. Izirer found that at the time of her
declaration, the woman believed that after her conversion she would
be able to observe certain important commandments—the laws of
family purity and the laws pertaining to the Sabbath and kosher
food—and she explained that she also hoped to be able to observe
more commandments in the future. Therefore Dayan Izirer conclud-

92

See the judgment of the High Rabbinical Court in case 1-12-9363, issued on Aug. 3,
2001.
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ed that at the time of her conversion her acceptance of the commandments was partial and, consequently, not sufficient. He ruled
that her conversion was not valid, since a fundamental element in a
valid conversion to Judaism—acceptance of the burden of the commandments of Jewish law—was missing.
Rabbi Daikhovsky of the High Rabbinical Court did not share
the point of view of Rabbi Izirer and adopted instead a lenient approach. He considered it important that in this case the convert was
accepted to the Jewish faith and nation by a qualified Orthodox Jewish court. Although we know that the motivation of a candidate for
conversion is not appropriate—such as conversion for the sake of
marriage or a financial or other benefit to him or her—and although
we find out, after the conversion, that the convert violates the principles of Jewish law, since the act of conversion was performed in the
past and the candidate for conversion was accepted into the Jewish
community, the conversion is valid. After the conversion, this convert is a Jew. If he or she does not observe some of the commandments of Jewish law, they are Jews that act in an improper manner.
In addition, since the convert was granted the status of a Jew, his or
her marriage to a Jewish spouse is valid. Rabbi Daikhovsky quoted
from the writings of Maimonides, who noted that the wives of famous Jewish leaders in the Bible, like Samson and Solomon, remained with their spouses although their husbands found out, after
their conversions, that they were idol worshippers.93 Rabbi Daikhovsky granted due weight to the emphasis of Maimonides—that we
should not think, incorrectly, that “Samson, who saved the Jewish nation, and Solomon, the king of Israel, who is defined in the Bible as
‘the beloved of the Lord,’ married gentile women.”94 Although these
wives were sinners, and violated the prohibition of idolatry after their
conversion to Judaism, they were considered Jewish, and their Jewish
husbands could live with them. Their sins after their conversion did
not invalidate their conversions.
Rabbi Daikhovsky acknowledged that it is a different question
before the candidate for conversion is granted the status of a Jew for
the court that decides to convert him or her than what the legal policy
should be in regard to the status of the convert post factum, after being accepted as a Jew. He analyzes the text of Maimonides:

93
94

MISHNEH TORAH, Issurei Bi’ah 13:17.
See his decision, supra note 92.
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The wives of Samson and Solomon performed the sin
of idolatry. This is what is written in the Bible. Their
conversion was problematic at the beginning of the
process, since Maimonides wrote that “it was known
[at the beginning of the conversion process] that they
converted in an attempt to receive a benefit [i.e., marriage to these Jewish leaders].” In addition, “their acts
at the end, after their conversion, proved that they [violated the commandments of Jewish law and] performed [sins such as] idolatry at the beginning [immediately after their conversion]” and moreover, “they
were not converted by a [Jewish] court.” There are
three major problems [concerning the validity of this
conversion]. I have no doubt that if this kind of a candidate for conversion would present a request to be
accepted as a convert to the Rabbinical Court in
Rechovot [the court of Rabbi Izirer] this court would
rule she should not be accepted as a convert. It is possible that I would also have joined this opinion in
these circumstances. Nevertheless, [after they are accepted as converts] Maimonides regards them as Jews.
. . . [T]he status of a convert post factum, after the
conversion, is not identical to his or her status before
the conversion. After the conversion has been performed the conversion is valid and is not disqualified
[in a later stage].95
In addition, according to the perspective of Rabbi Daikhovsky, the
convert in this case was a sincere convert. He and Dayan Bar Shalom were impressed by the honest and reliable declaration of the
convert that she is observing the commandments of Judaism. She observed all the commandments of Judaism at the time of their decision
in the court of appeal, and they believed she had sincerely intended to
observe these commandments at the first stage, when she was accepted as a convert. They explained that she was sincere when she declared in the court of appeal that she intended to observe all the
commandments of Jewish law eventually. However, since she knew
it is difficult to observe all these commandments immediately, she
decided it was more practical to begin by observing the main com95

Judgment of the High Rabbinical Court in case 1-12-9363, issued on Aug. 3, 2001.
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mandments of Judaism, such as the rules pertaining to Kosher food,
keeping the Sabbath, and the rules of family purity.
These Jewish judges based their decision in this context upon
the precedent of the ruling of a prominent Rabbi in the twentieth century, Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodjinsky. He decided that when a foreigner accepts the burden of the Jewish commandments in a partial
manner, such as the manner of commitment in this case, the acceptance of these commandments is sufficient and the conversion is
valid.96 When a foreigner declares that he will observe the Jewish
commandments, but assumes that in the beginning it will be practical
to observe only certain basic and important commandments, such as
those mentioned in the decision of Rabbi Daikhovsky, the conversion
is valid. Rabbi Daikhovsky stressed that Rabbi Grodjinsky wrote that
this could be the policy of a Rabbinical court concerning the acceptance of the commandments at the first stage—before the convert
is accepted as a Jew. The Dayanim Daikhovsky and Bar Shalom emphasized that this certainly should be the policy of this court post factum, after the conversion.
Although it is important to assist immigrants who wish to
convert to Judaism, we must admit that the perspective of Rabbi
Daikhovsky could be challenged. The convert in this case lived with
her children and husband whom she married in a civil, not a religious,
marriage ceremony. Rabbi Daikhovsky explained that indeed a religious Jew should not violate the prohibition on cohabiting with another Jew when they did not marry in a valid Jewish wedding ceremony. However, since the woman had established a family with her
spouse and was living with him and his children, Rabbi Daikovsky
could understand why it was difficult for her not to violate this prohibition. He believed the focus should be upon the fact that, although
on the one hand she cohabited with this individual, on the other hand
she kept in a strict manner all the rules of family purity pertaining to
her relationship with him.
The minority point of view in this judgment, of Rabbi Abraham Sherman, was based upon the assumption that if the observance
of the commandments of Jewish law by the convert was partial, the
conversion was not valid. He shared the outlook of the Rabbinical
court in Rechovot in this case that when this observance was partial,
or even not perfect, the conversion is not valid. Since the court knew
96

Responsa Achiezer 3:26.
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that after her conversion this convert did not observe all the rules of
Jewish law pertaining to the Sabbath, and he believed her statement
concerning her religious outlook did not fit with the ideology of Orthodox Judaism, Rabbi Sherman argued that the court should not accept her conversion as valid. In addition, he explained that there was
another factor which strengthened the doubts of this court about the
validity of the conversion in this case: her cohabitation with a person
she did not marry in an Orthodox Jewish marriage ceremony. According to Rabbi Sherman, when in subsequent proceedings in another Rabbinical court facts are revealed to the judges that cast doubt
upon a candidate’s sincerity before the court that accepted her to the
Jewish nation, the court should investigate, on its own initiative,
whether the conversion performed by the Rabbinical court was valid.
Among other reasons, this investigation is necessary because when a
past conversion is not valid, the Rabbinical court cannot approve a
request that a Jewish marriage ceremony be performed between the
convert and a Jewish spouse, as a Jew cannot marry a non-Jew under
Jewish religious law.
The point of view of Rabbi Sherman was presented in a more
extreme and clear-cut manner in a subsequent decision of the Rabbinical court of appeals. In this case, Rabbi Sherman, Rabbi Izirer, and
Rabbi Sheinfeld shared the same strict point of view.97 Their decision was in an appeal on the challenge of Rabbi Atia, in the Rabbinical court in Ashdod, to the lenient policy of the Rabbinical courts for
conversion in Israel. He attacked, in particular, the policy of Rabbi
Drukman, who had accepted the request of the convert in this case to
join the Jewish nation. Rabbi Atia refused to give a woman who was
converted in the court of Rabbi Drukman a divorce certificate because he claimed her conversion was not valid; since he stated the
woman is not Jewish, her religious marriage to her Jewish husband
was not valid and therefore an act of divorce would not be necessary.
Between the lines of these arguments we can find two distinct
attitudes towards the interpretation of the religion principles pertaining to conversion: the flexible attitude and the strict attitude, disguised as an attempt to achieve religious “truth.” The strict and suspicious attitude pertaining to conversion of immigrants in Israel and
the placing of significant and problematic obstacles that do not enable
the conversion of many immigrants, their relatives, and spouses is
97

See Judgment of the High Rabbinical Court in case 5489-64-1, issued on Oct. 2, 2008.
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presented as an attempt to achieve religious pureness and holiness.
But these candidates for conversion often have to pay a very high
price as a result of this policy. The main group that will suffer from a
strict policy is the society of immigrants, with their relatives and
spouses, who came to Israel as a result of a right granted to them in
the Law of Return. In his decision in the prior case, Rabbi Daikhovsky presented the suffering and humiliation of candidates for conversion in Israel, especially from weak segments of society, in a persuasive manner. He explained that when a proselyte has converted to
Judaism in an ordinary Rabbinical court or in a special court for conversion, and he approaches a regular Rabbinical court in subsequent
litigation, such as to request the division of an estate between the inheritors or property between the spouses or a divorce suit:
[C]an each [Rabbinical] court be free to investigate
[what is the legal status of the convert] . . . and determine he is not a Jew? And what if his children or
grandchildren need [the services of the] Rabbinical
courts, could all courts examine their legal status [as
Jews] until 1000 generations? Can we torture the
convert anytime he or his descendants need [the services of] a Rabbinical court for any purpose? . . . . I
think that repeated investigation of such a sensitive
matter and the continuation of this investigation in future generations . . . could result in a problematic situation of torture and abuse [of converts and their children].98
Rabbinical courts for conversion can investigate, on their own
initiative, whether a candidate for conversion is sincere. But after
they decide they are accepting a candidate and they state he is a Jew,
further investigation of the convert’s behavior is unnecessary and
humiliating. Such a lenient policy is in the spirit of the sensitivity of
Jewish law and the concern in Judaism over the appropriate relationship between one individual and another. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court of Israel has sometimes sided with Jewish immigrant
groups who were adversely affected by the policy of the Rabbinate or
the Rabbinical courts regarding their conversion.99
98

Judgment of the High Rabbinical Court in case 1-12-9363, issued on Aug. 3, 2001.
See HCJ 230/86 Shoshanah (Susan) Miller v. The Minister of Interior [1986] IsrSC
40(4) 436, 447–48.
99
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The outcome of an investigation into the real intentions of a
candidate for conversion can be cruel to the candidate and his or her
children. Truth is a value in Jewish law. However, there are also
other important values in Judaism. A verse in the Book of Proverbs
says about the ways of the Torah (Biblical Jewish Law) that “[i]ts
ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are paths of peace.”100
In light of this verse, the Babylonian Talmud concluded that “the
[goal of the] whole Torah [also its purpose] is to promote peace.”101
From this point of view, peace is one of the most important principles
of Judaism and it constitutes an ideological foundation for all the
commandments of the Torah. Other verses in the Torah praise an individual who walks in the paths of peace.102 The competing values of
truth and peace should be balanced in Jewish law in an appropriate
manner. An important Jewish text states “truth, and judgment of
peace you shall judge in your cities.”103 Rabbi Kook emphasized that
in a deep sense, truth and peace coincide in Judaism: “[I]t is all one
Torah. The peace aims to [achieve] the [deeper] truth. [Peace] is not
[a] concession about the [definition of the] truth but [a] precision on
it [in a deeper understanding of truth] and justice derives from the
peace.”104
Hillel, an important Rabbi in the ancient period, attributed
significance to peace: “Hillel would say: Be a disciple of Aaron—a
lover of peace, a pursuer of peace, one who loves human beings and
draws them close to the Torah.”105 An ancient Jewish text states that
scholars of Jewish law, including the Dayanim in Rabbinical courts,

100

Proverbs 3:17.
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gitin 59:72.
102
E.g., Psalms 37:37 (“Observe the innocent and see the upright, for there is a future for
the man of peace.”); Proverbs 12:20 (“There is deceit in the heart of those who plot evil, but
for the counselors of peace there is joy.”); 1 Chronicles 22:7–10 (“And David said to Solomon, ‘My son, as for me, it was in my heart to build a House in the name of the Lord my God. But the word of the Lord was upon me, saying: “You have shed much blood, and you
have waged great wars; you shall not build a House in My Name because you have shed
much blood to the ground before Me. Behold a son will be born to you; he will be a man of
peace, and I shall give him peace from all his enemies around about, for Solomon will be his
name, and I shall give peace and quiet to Israel in his days. He shall build a House in My
Name, and he shall be to Me as a son, and I to him as a Father, and I shall prepare the throne
of his kingdom forever.” ’ ”).
103
Zechariah 8:16.
104
2 IGROT HARAYAH 294 (1985); see also 1 IGROT HARAYAH 174 (1985) (“The truth cannot be partial; the truth has to be comprehensive.”).
105
MISHNA, Ethics of the Fathers 1:12.
101
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should enhance peace in the world.106
The path of Hillel, preferring peace over the strict and uncompromising “truth,” conflicted with the strict and rigid path of another scholar named Shammai. Among other things, these two scholars disagreed regarding the policy of accepting converts to the Jewish
nation:
Our Rabbis taught: A certain heathen [the candidate
for conversion] once came before Shammai and asked
him, “How many Torahs have you?” “Two,” he replied, “the Written Torah and the Oral Torah.” “I believe you with respect to the Written, but not with respect to the Oral Torah; make me a convert on
condition that you teach me the Written Torah [only].”
[But Shammai] scolded and repulsed him in anger.
When [the candidate for conversion] went before Hillel, he accepted him as a convert. On the first day, he
taught him, Alef, beth, gimmel, daleth [the first four
letters of the Hebrew alphabet]; the following day
[Hillel] reversed [them] to him. “But yesterday you
did not teach them to me thus,” he protested. “Must
you then not rely upon me [Hillel]? Then rely upon
me with respect to the Oral [Torah] too.”
On another occasion it happened that a certain
heathen [the candidate for conversion] came before
Shammai and said to him, “Make me a convert, on
condition that you teach me the whole Torah while I
stand on one foot.” Thereupon [Shammai] repulsed
him with the builder’s cubit which was in his hand.
When he went before Hillel, he said to him, “ ‘What is
hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor;’ that is the
whole Torah, while the rest is the commentary thereof; go and learn it.”
On another occasion it happened that a certain
heathen [the candidate for conversion] was passing
behind the Beth Hamidrash [a Jewish academy of
learning], when he heard the voice of a teacher reciting, “and these are the garments which they shall

106

Bamidbar Rabbah 11:18.
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make; a breastplate and an ephod.” Said he, “For
whom are these?” “For the High Priest,” he was told.
Then said that heathen to himself, “I will go and become a convert, that I may be appointed to a High
Priest.” So he went before Shammai and said to him,
“Make me a convert on condition that you appoint me
as a High Priest” [an ulterior motive]. But he repulsed
him with the builder’s cubit which was in his hand.
[The candidate for conversion] then went before Hillel, who accepted him as a convert. Said he to him,
“Can any man be made a king but he who knows the
arts of government? Do you go and study the arts of
government!” He went and read. When he came to
“and the stranger that cometh nigh shall be put to
death,” he asked him, “To whom does this verse apply?” “Even to David King of Israel” was the answer.
Thereupon the convert reasoned within himself a fortiori: if Israel, who are called sons of the Omnipresent,
and who in his love for them He designated them, “Israel is My son, My firstborn,” yet it is written of them,
“and the stranger that cometh nigh shall be put to
death,” how much more so a mere convert, who comes
with his staff and wallet! . . . He went before Hillel
and said to him, “O gentle Hillel, blessings rest on thy
head for bringing me under the wings of the
Shekhinah [Divine Presence]!” Some time later the
three [converts] met in one place; said they, “Shammai’s impatience sought to drive us from the world,
but Hillel’s gentleness brought us under the wings of
the Shekhinah.”107
In three cases Shammai does not want to convert the candidate since this candidate is not willing to accept the whole burden of
the Jewish commandments. Among other things, in his opinion, it is
forbidden to convert a person who only wants to learn the Written
Torah and not the Oral Torah, or a person who wants to learn the
whole Torah while standing on one foot. In these cases Hillel is
ready to convert the candidate even though his conversion is not
complete at the first stage. In one case, when the convert stood on
107

BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sabbath 31:2.
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one foot, Hillel told him that “What is hateful to you, do not do to
your neighbor” is a principle that summarizes the whole Torah and
that the rest of the commandments are an interpretation of this principle. He trusted the convert and saw the good potential in him and believed that in the future he would investigate the deep meaning of the
principle he taught him and observe all the commandments as a result
of his learning what he is commanded and not commanded to do.
The path of peace—the path of Hillel—is preferable. This
perspective of Jewish law and the perspective of enhancing autonomy, human liberty, and freedom coincide, leading to the same conclusion: the lenient approach is preferable in the sphere of conversion
of immigrants and other members of weaker segments in Israeli society.
VI.

THE PERSPECTIVE OF GENDER

Most of the converts to Judaism in Israel are women. This
could be the result of many factors, including the rule in Jewish law
that the religious identity of a Jew is determined by his or her mother.
A son or daughter of a Jewish mother is a Jew. Most of those who
could benefit from the moderate approach concerning requirements
for conversion are therefore women. A more lenient interpretation of
the Jewish law of conversion can assist especially these female immigrants and their daughters.
Interpretation of Jewish law in an attempt to assist women
was the policy of the Supreme Court Justice Menachem Elon in the
Shakdiel case.108 Local religious councils in Israel provide Jewish religious services to the local residents. The members of the religious
councils are nominated by the Minister of Religious Affairs, the local
Chief Rabbis, and the existing council members. In this case, the local Chief Rabbi opposed the nomination of Leah Shakdiel, a woman,
to the religious council of her town. He claimed Jewish law forbids a
woman from holding a post as a member of a religious council. The
two Chief Rabbis of Israel and the Chief Rabbinate of Israel supported this point of view. In this case, the Supreme Court believed that
the exclusion of a woman from membership in a religious council is
gender discrimination. Justice Elon adopted an internal solution,
within the boundaries of Jewish law. He did not state that the exter-

108

HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221.
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nal principle of gender equality overrides the religious view that
women cannot be members of religious councils. Instead, he focused
upon two possible interpretations to the question: Does Jewish law
enable women to be members of religious councils? Although the
Chief Rabbinate of Israel was not in favor of the nomination of women as members in religious councils, Justice Elon weighed the evidence and concluded, “There is strong support within halakhic [Jewish law] framework itself, for the view that the petitioner, as a
woman, should not be barred from membership of a religious council.”109
A similar approach can assist females who are candidates for
conversion in Israel. The adoption of the lenient approach within
Jewish law—the approach of Rabbi Daikhovsky—can enable more
candidates to fulfill their dream to be Jews.
VII.

FEMINISM AND MULTICULTURALISM

Multiculturalism is common in many liberal democratic societies today. Presently residing in these societies, side by side, are
individuals from different ethnic, racial, and religious groups. The
ideology, outlook, values, and religion of members of different
groups are not identical. While the state or the courts must balance
these groups’ contrasting interests and values, those who grant due
respect to multiculturalism wish to secure recognition and representation of the variety of interests and values of all ethnic, racial, and religious groups in society.110
Society should protect minority groups, especially when they
have special cultural or religious values. The majority should not silence the voice of the minority. But should controversial values be
safeguarded? If we take multiculturalism seriously, they should be
safeguarded in order to accomplish the basic goal of the liberal democratic society: equal recognition and representation for all members
109

Id. at 247–71.
See Amy Gutman, Introduction to MULTICULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION 3 (Amy Gutman ed., 1992); Isaak Dore & Michael T. Carper, Multiculturalism, Pluralism, and Pragmatism: Political Gridlock or Theoretical Impasse?, 10
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 71, 73 (2002). Regarding the value of preserving
the culture of different groups, see also Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and
the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy,
in AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE 251 (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle
eds., 1994); Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW
AND SOCIETY 247 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
110
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of society. Presently, this mission has not been fully accomplished,
since in many liberal democratic societies there are some groups with
special values. They are not the mainstream in these societies and
suffer from lack of representation or misrepresentation. The goal of
proponents of liberal democratic societies should be the elimination
of all forms of inequality. We can achieve this goal by recognizing
the unique values and ideology of all groups.111 The liberal point of
view requires that all cultural groups in society will be granted equal
legitimacy and should all be treated with due respect and tolerance.112
We should grant each cultural group in society an equal opportunity
to determine its own aspirations, customs, and values, which are the
basic outcomes of its ideology. A group should be able to express itself without unnecessary constraints or deprivation.113
The difficulty in implementing multiculturalism arises whenever the cultural claims and cultural values of different groups contradict one another. Sometimes, as the result of liberal humanistic
outlook, society wishes to protect the values and ideology of a conservative group although its values and ideology are contradictory to
111

Dore & Carper, supra note 110, at 78. Some scholars reject the opinion discussed earlier regarding tolerance and respect for the values of different cultures. See, e.g., ROBERT H.
BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 313
(1997). Bork questions the status granted to multiculturalism in society and law in the United States. In his opinion, this status might cause a split within American society. In addition, it could result in the devaluation of the central cultural values of American society. He
also expressed concern that American culture could devolve towards the undesirable characteristics of the barbarian society.
112
See STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 60–63 (1999). Fish makes a distinction between two forms of multiculturalism: boutique multiculturalism and strong multiculturalism. The first form is characterized by a sympathetic yet superficial approach towards
the culture of others. This is the multiculturalism of “boutiques,” which welcomes ethnic
food of different groups in the population. On the superficial level, it declares that it accepts
the culture of others. However, when the values or conduct of others contradict the values of
the individual who claims he adheres to this form of multiculturalism, he rejects them. Boutique multiculturalism is based upon the assumption that the cultural values of others should
not be accepted when such acceptance conflicts with the values of the cultural group of those
adhering to this form of multiculturalism. In these circumstances, the beliefs and convictions of those adhering to boutique multiculturalism are superior.
The other form of multiculturalism is based upon a commitment to promote special characteristics of the cultural values and customs of others, in an attempt to prevent discrimination among cultures. However, Fish stresses that this form of multiculturalism is also not
absolute, as respect and tolerance towards the values of an intolerant culture becomes problematic. The adherent to this form of multiculturalism could probably choose to be intolerant to the values of the intolerant culture (such as fundamental Islam) on behalf of a common
consensus on the values of his dominant culture. However, when he desires to act in this
manner, his policy is actually not strong multiculturalism but boutique multiculturalism.
113
Dore & Carper, supra note 110, at 78.
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those of the liberal Western society.114 Here, there may be a significant tension between the desire to enhance tolerance and equal treatment of women, and multiculturalism, which respects and tolerates
the practices and ideology of all groups in society—including more
traditional and religious groups that may adhere to traditional patterns
of control and authority over women.115
What is the optimal approach for those who strive to promote
the values of feminism in a multicultural society? What should be
the policy of a liberal democratic society when ethnic groups or religious groups, or some other segments of society, preserve or promote
patriarchal power structures? Proponents of multiculturalism have
suggested several formulas for balancing between multiculturalism
and feminism. Some have held that there should be more emphasis
on multiculturalism. Their commitment to multiculturalism led to
their conclusion that some aspirations of the feminist movement are
impossible in a situation where feminism and multiculturalism
clash.116
A second solution to this dilemma is based upon the assumption that protection should at times be granted to cultures that treat
men and women unequally, including those that preserve biased legal
arrangements regarding the relationships between men and women.
However, this protection should be granted to these cultures only
when they are at risk of extinction.117
A third approach suggests it is possible and appropriate to
promote both multiculturalism and feminism at the same time. The
114

Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Women, Religion, and Multiculturalism in Israel, 5 UCLA J.
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 339, 340–41 (2000).
115
MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 65 (1999); Sherifa Zuhur, Empowering Women or
Dislodging Sectarianism?: Civil Marriage in Lebanon, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 199
(2002).
116
See, e.g., Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS
69 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 2000); Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural
Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105, 127 (1992); Chandran Kukathas, Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?, 15 PUB. AFF. 83 (2001). Kukathas held that the state should demonstrate tolerance towards a variety of cultures, despite the fact that an outcome of this policy could be
tolerance towards patriarchal patterns of behavior.
117
See generally Margalit & Halbertal, supra note 27. The authors’ position in this matter
is opposed to that of scholars who believe that cultures denying gender equality should be
replaced by egalitarian societies. Nevertheless, some of these scholars were realistic, softened their position, and supported a more moderate approach—acting on the inside—that
would achieve the desirable change in the field of gender equality without replacing the ancient society. See Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 9 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
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desired outcome is to strike a reasonable balance between multiculturalism and feminism on a case-by-case basis.118
The past solutions to the dilemma of finding a desirable balance between multiculturalism and feminism were a sincere attempt
to grant due weight to both philosophies. However, this goal can be
reached today by taking an alternate approach that could enhance and
promote a desirable balance between multiculturalism and feminism.
Scholars and policymakers can focus upon a dynamic internal solution within the framework of the relevant religion’s evolution. The
adherents of feminism should initiate dialogues with spiritual leaders
of those groups that preserve patriarchal rules and traditional practices and attempt to convince them that they could and should interpret
their religious laws in a manner that will enhance the best interests of
women.
The feminist political philosopher Susan M. Okin would not
agree with such a solution, arguing that it grants too much weight to
multiculturalism by preserving patriarchal principles and conduct.
Okin would argue that feminism should be afforded more weight, as
it seeks to promote respect and equality for all individuals.119 Nevertheless, she concedes that we can justify the protection of certain aspects of a minority culture, such as its language, and should attempt
to be empathetic when cultural groups implement legitimate cultural
practices and rules that are different from those of the majority culture.120
The approach of Professor Ruth Halperin-Kaddari is similar
118
Will Kymlicka, Liberal Complacencies, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?,
supra note 117, at 31. Kymlicka adheres to a proper balance between different, colliding
values and rights, including a possible conflict between multiculturalism and human rights.
In his opinion, there are limitations imposed upon the cultural rights of those who belong to
minority groups, as a result of the relevance of principles such as freedom, democracy, and
social justice. See also WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY
OF MINORITY RIGHTS 76 (1996).
119
Okin, supra note 117, at 9.
120
See id. at 18, 23. In the author’s opinion the liberal approach which leads to the justifications of multiculturalism should be balanced with the fear that support of multiculturalism
means support of patriarchy and damage to women. Okin’s basic position is shared by Leti
Volpp, a feminist scholar who believes that as a matter of principle, feminism should be the
paramount consideration when we cannot resolve the conflict between feminism and the cultural principles of certain groups of immigrants to the United States, although Volpp believes
that all cultures are patriarchal. In these groups, customs such as marriage of young girls are
commonly an outcome of unequal power relations between men and women. See Leti
Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89, 105–06 (2000); Leti
Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1573 (1996).
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to that of Okin. She argues that the fact that women choose to belong
to a group that implements unequal and oppressive norms towards
them does not justify their oppression and discrimination. Yet, she
shares Okin’s opinion that an effort should be made to promote the
status of women in their group through a creative use of the group
norms, including the interpretation of its rules.121 Okin and HalperinKaddari granted more weight to feminism but did not choose the approach of direct confrontation with the traditional and religious
groups and their norms. They were realistic and did not want to endanger the positive results that the nascent feminist movement had
already achieved for women in these groups. While holding feminism to be paramount, they avoided the external path—a total attack
on traditional groups and their patriarchal rules and practices. Their
goal was to find an optimal solution for women who choose to belong
to these groups.122
The tension between multiculturalism and feminism as discussed above was presented in a manner relevant to the reality of
many liberal democratic countries. However, there is a significant
distinction between the analysis of the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism in Israel and the analysis of this issue in other
countries, such as the United States and Canada. In the latter countries, the main problem consists of the patriarchal practices of minority populations. Taking multiculturalism seriously, the state should
grant protection to the minority culture. The culture of the majority
should not suppress or extinguish that of the minority. The legal situation is different in the State of Israel.123 Recognized religious sects
and their religious courts hold sole or parallel jurisdiction in the law
of the State of Israel in matters of personal status. In certain matters,
such as the marriage and divorce of Jews, an exclusive jurisdiction
had been granted to the Rabbinical courts. The relevant principles of
Jewish law are applied in these courts and interpreted by a traditional
group—the religious judges, Dayanim—who are trained in Orthodox
religious institutions and share a conservative approach to the boundaries of legitimate interpretation of Jewish law. Consequently, the
121

Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 114, at 342.
Such “external” direct attack could result in the adoption of uncompromising policies
in the religious community that resists what it conceives as “coercion” from the outside. The
result of the adoption of these policies might be stronger opposition in the religious community to new interpretation of religious law in light of the contemporary ideology of gender
equality in modern society.
123
Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 114, at 342.
122
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process of balancing between multiculturalism and feminism in Israel
should be different from that in nations such as the United States and
Canada.
Indeed, the religious customs and practices of Orthodox Jews
in Israel are those of a minority culture, but it is not a minority at risk
of extinction. On the contrary, this culture is granted enforceable legal power in Rabbinical courts. It can coerce individuals from the
minority and the majority to adhere to principles of Jewish law that
are sometimes patriarchal. The State of Israel granted a conservative
minority group the power to implement its ideology in one of the
more significant areas of family law—marriage and divorce of
Jews—and sometimes this power is granted to this group in other
matters of personal status, such as custody and guardianship of children. In this regard, the majority population in Israel could be subjected to the ideology and legal practices of the minority. According
to liberal ideology, this policy is controversial. It could potentially
violate human rights, which are granted to all individuals living in the
country. Some claim that this policy is unacceptable for the majority
of Jews in Israel who do not belong to the conservative religious
group. A minority ideology cannot justify the price many Jews in Israel pay in the domain of human rights and liberal values in many
spheres, including equality between the sexes.124
There are some religious Jews in Israel who are also feminists
and argue that the implementation of Jewish legal principles, which
are not always egalitarian,125 in Israeli Rabbinical courts is problematic from the feminist perspective because it results in application of
unequal rules in regulating the relationship between men and women.126
The Israeli legislature, however, has chosen to grant binding
status to the principles of this conservative religious group and has
124

Liora Bilski, Cultural Import: The Case of Feminism in Israel, 25 TEL AVIV UNIV. L.
REV. 523, 561–62 (2002); Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Legal Pluralism in Israel and the Rabbinical Courts in Israel After the Court Verdicts of Bavli and Lev, 20 TEL AVIV UNIV. L. REV.
683, 745 (1997); Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, More About Legal Pluralism in Israel, 23 TEL
AVIV UNIV. L. REV. 559, 567 (2000).
125
Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 114, at 352.
126
See id. at 348–52. In the author’s opinion, the division of roles and spheres of activity
between men and women, which is an outcome of the patriarchal family structure, is reinforced in the Israeli legal system as a result of the legal importance granted to principles of
Jewish law on marriage and divorce. See also Halperin-Kaddari, More About Legal Pluralism in Israel, supra note 124, at 567–71 (discussing the “dark side” of legal pluralism, which
portrays an inherent confrontation between liberalism and pluralism).
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reaffirmed this legal practice by renewing its validity. In 1992, the
Knesset enacted two important constitutional laws—Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.
These Basic Laws preserved all the rules of law enacted in the past,
including rules that incorporated, implicitly or explicitly, unequal religious principles that sometimes discriminate against women. In addition, Israel’s current political reality makes it unlikely that any attempt in the Knesset to enact new rules which will change the
aforementioned foundations of family law will be successful.
In Israel’s unique reality, what is the proper balance between
multiculturalism and feminism? An interpretation of Jewish law that
takes into consideration the special needs and aspirations of women is
the more realistic alternative. Such an interpretation can elevate the
legal status of Jewish women in Israel in legal matters that are within
the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical courts. It is not surprising that religious feminist scholars in Israel prefer the “internal” mode of action—reform within the religious constraints of Orthodox Judaism.
These scholars believe that this mode of action can produce an effective result for those who wish to enhance the power and rights of
Jewish women in the Rabbinical courts.127
Religious feminists, such as Israel’s Orthodox Jewish women,
prefer the “internal” solution because it coincides with their religious
beliefs. The radical, “external” approach attempts to uproot power
structures in society, religion, and culture, thereby challenging the
foundations, morals, and principles of the religious establishment and
religious ideology. Religious women prefer efforts to bridge and
compromise, as much as possible, between feminism and religion.
These women, including religious Jewish feminists, are aware of the
fact that their mission is problematic at present. They must face the
difficulty resulting from their double fidelity: the commitment to a
life of faith versus their loyalty to humanistic values of liberty and
equality.128 One activist has stated that religious Jewish feminist
women today are faced with the following dilemma: from the feminist viewpoint, is it possible that the Torah, which Jews believe displays eternal truth, lacks the egalitarian perception and the values that
feminist women cherish so much today?129 The religious conviction
of these women leads them to conclude that it is unacceptable to re127
128
129

See Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 114, at 344–45, 365.
Hanna Kehat, Breaking the Patriarchal Circle, 22 PANIM 23, 28 (2002).
Rivkah Lubitz, The Pain of Tzlophad’s Daughters, 22 PANIM 129, 133 (2002).
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gard the Torah as being old and irrelevant to modern women. These
women are believers and are committed to an ideology that the Torah
is the eternal truth.130
Performing an “internal” act within a religious society can
lead to a change that will be accepted by both the religious establishment and religious feminists. We can derive this conclusion from the
struggle that led to the granting of the status of Toa’anot rabaniyot to
women in Israel. Toa’anot rabaniyot are Orthodox Jewish women
who are capable of implementing their knowledge of Jewish law
when they represent their clients—many times women—in legal proceedings before the Rabbinical courts. Originally, only men could
represent clients in legal proceedings in these courts. When women
wished to enter this profession and requested authorization to represent clients in the Rabbinical courts, they encountered strong opposition from sections of the Jewish religious community in Israel, including some of the Dayanim. As a result, women had to overcome
various obstacles and resistance. When women pushed to obtain the
requisite licenses to represent clients before these courts, the scope of
the requirements was expanded and the difficulty level of the exams
was heightened. Women who were preparing for the exams were not
given proper information regarding the material they were required to
study. Many Toanim rabaniyim—men who represent clients in Rabbinical courts—refused to accept women as interns, thereby denying
women the necessary experience. Some of the Dayanim prohibited
women from sitting in court as spectators, so they could not learn
practical aspects of litigation procedure and evidence, which they
would need to implement when they represented clients in the courtroom.131 Nevertheless, women were successful in their struggle and
eventually received the accreditation to be Toa’anot rabaniyot.
This is perceived by some scholars as a feminist achievement
within the boundaries set by Jewish law and the Jewish religious establishment. Toa’anot rabaniyot, as women who are dedicated to
their religious conviction, did not wish to undermine the religious
system of the Rabbinical courts. They had to operate within the limi-

130

See id. at 134.
Ronen Shamir, Michal Shitrai & Nelly Elias, Mission, Feminism and Professionalism:
Toa’anot Rabaniyot in the Orthodox Community, 38 MEGAMOT 313, 328–29 (1997); see also
Bilski, supra note 124, at 561–62 (interpreting the struggle of the Toa’anot Rabaniyot for
recognition of their status as a feminist struggle); Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 114, at 354–
56.
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tations set by the religion and the religious establishment. Since this
establishment can be hostile to the feminist movement, they sometimes had to publicly claim they were not part of this movement.132
In addition, they emphasized that they were dedicated to a religious
ideology and lifestyle.133 However, their accreditation and work on
behalf of women in the Rabbinical courts is de facto a feminist
achievement.
The rest of the world follows a similar pattern. The difficulty
experienced by Orthodox Jewish women—who wish to combine their
personal outlook that women should promote their own status in society and law as much as possible together with their religious commitment—is not a phenomenon unique to Judaism.
This aspiration to enhance women’s rights in a traditional religious society is also evident in the writings of some Muslim women. Certain rules of Islamic law and the practices of Islamic society
reflect the fact that in several domains Muslim women retain an inferior status.134 Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to implement a policy of compromise between feminism and Islamic ideology. It is not
a simple task to convince Muslim spiritual leaders that they can and
should interpret Islamic law in an attempt to enhance the status of
Muslim women. Fundamentalist Muslims will reject “external” influences, but moderate forces within Islam may welcome an attempt
to interpret Islamic law in a manner that will produce a common denominator between the feminist Western outlook and the religious
perspectives of Muslim law.135
Some have claimed that the international standards concerning the status of women in law and society, adopted by the international community as a response to the initiative of Western states,
contradict the basic principles of Islam and therefore the effort to
promote these standards should be conceived as an imperialistic, antiIslamic attempt to subject Islamic society to foreign attitudes. These
132

Shamir et al., supra note 131, at 331.
Id.
134
Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion, and Rights: The Future Legal Status of
Palestinian Women, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 149, 157–61 (1994).
135
See Aziza Al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights, 12
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (1997); Sajeda Amin & Sara Hossain, Religious and Cultural
Rights: Women’s Reproductive Rights and the Politics of Fundamentalism: A View From
Bangladesh, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1319 (1995); Abdullahi Ahmed An-N’aim, Human Rights in
the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (1990).
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scholars held that the judgment of Islamic lifestyle through a Western
prism is actually a control mechanism used by the world’s powerful
groups in developed countries. 136 These groups oppress and suppress
the traditional ideology of the Islamic countries and use their power
in an attempt to silence the voice of the weaker segments of society
in the world. Many Islamic countries opposed the concept of adopting new trends in Islamic law in light of Western feminist ideology.
These Islamic countries regard this as a revolution from the outside,
using the enhancement of women’s liberty as a justification for imposition of foreign and problematic ideas. Scholars sometimes believe
that the assumption that feminism should be the dominant ideology in
these circumstances is similar, to an extent, to the viewpoint of some
Western women during the colonial period, who believed that colonialism was positive since it improved the legal and social status of
women in the colonies. These Western women stressed that the necessary mission of colonial powers was to import the values of the
Western civilization into “backward” societies.137
Presently, the objection to the trend of importing Western
feminist ideology to Muslim societies is based upon the assumption
that the goal of the feminist movement today is the implementation of
“external” Western norms onto Muslim women. This opposition to
feminist influences is presented as an objection to Western dominance, which is viewed as a threat to the preservation of authentic Islamic culture. These opponents claim that their objection stems from
their sensitivity and due respect to the values of Muslim societies that
wish to preserve Islamic women’s traditional lifestyle.138 In addition,
in a number of cases in the past, the Western pressure of trying to
improve the status of Muslim women was counterproductive, as it
sometimes caused the toughening of traditional standards and practices common in these societies in reaction. Many times the external
pressure resulted in a tendency to reject the basic foundations of the
Western women’s equal rights movement altogether.139
136
Deniz Kandiyoti, Introduction to WOMEN, ISLAM, AND THE STATE 1, 7 (Deniz Kandiyoti ed., 1991).
137
See ANTOINETTE BURTON, BURDENS OF HISTORY: BRITISH FEMINISTS, INDIAN WOMEN,
AND IMPERIAL CULTURE 1865–1915 (1994); VRON WARE, BEYOND THE PALE: WHITE
WOMEN, RACISM, AND HISTORY 156–67 (1992); WESTERN WOMEN AND IMPERIALISM:
COMPLICITY AND RESISTANCE (Nupur Chaudhuri & Margaret Strobel eds., 1992).
138
See Kandiyoti, supra note 136, at 8.
139
Regarding Muslim society’s attitude towards the new agenda of women’s human
rights, see SHAHEEN SARDAR ALI, GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM AND
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One opponent to the implementation of Western feminist ideology in Muslim society was the scholar Al-Hibri. She investigated
women’s status in Islamic culture and claimed that Okin’s balance
between traditional religious ideologies and the conflicting outlook of
feminism was not appropriate. Her criticism was that Okin did not
grant due weight to traditional religious ideology. She also claimed
that the weight of multiculturalism should be more significant when it
is balanced against feminism. In her opinion, Okin granted too much
weight to the fact that certain principles in the Islamic world and religion promoted the dominance and authority of men over women.140
Al-Hibri stressed that a feminist perspective in favor of reform in
Muslim countries or within groups of Muslim immigrants in Western
countries should always be balanced by the counter-perspective: respect for the religious and cultural principles of Muslims. She was
under the impression that Okin silenced the authentic voice of Muslim women and that the adoption of her policy infringed upon their
freedom of expression. According to Al-Hibri, Muslim women
should be given a fair opportunity to express their original voice. Her
criticism was that Okin enabled this voice to be heard only when it
coincided with the dominant concepts of Western feminism that
shape policy in liberal democratic societies. Al-Hibri claimed that
the imposition of Western feminist concepts upon the populations in
Muslim countries and Muslims in Western countries was an attempt
to oppress their Islamic culture. She believed that this approach
stemmed from a patronizing agenda that is implemented by the
world’s majority and by multicultural societies upon Muslim members in minority groups.141
Some critics even claimed that the attempt to impose Western
principles on groups that adhere to a conservative agenda regarding
women is an act of arrogance. According to these critics, the imposition of values from the outside stems from a lack of respect and tolerance towards the beliefs and choices of the women belonging to these
groups.142 They held that this strong paternalistic approach is a subINTERNATIONAL LAW: EQUAL BEFORE ALLAH, UNEQUAL BEFORE MAN? 24–49, 220–46
(2000).
140
Aziza Y. Al-Hibri, Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority
Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 117, at 41, 42.
141
See id. at 41–46.
142
David M. Smolin, Will International Human Rights Be Used as a Tool of Cultural
Genocide?: The Interaction of Human Rights Norms, Religion, Culture and Gender, 12 J.L.
& RELIGION 143, 171 (1995–96).
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stantial danger to human freedom since it does not enable these
women—who wish to act as they please in the fundamental aspects
of their lives, such as religion, family, parenting, and education—to
live according to their convictions.143
The tension between the desire of women to belong to a traditional patriarchal society and the attempt of the feminist movement to
“save” them from the hegemony of men in their society exists not only in regard to Muslim communities in Western countries, but also in
regard to female members of other conservative communities, such as
ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups in the United States, including two
groups: Chasidey Satmer and Lubavitch.144 From the feminist perspective, women who maintain a religious Jewish patriarchal lifestyle
desire to preserve this tradition as a result of “false consciousness.”145
However, men and women who choose this path sometimes claim
that this attitude is an insult and this accusation about their mental
awareness requires empirical proof, since they have adopted a religious and conservative ideology with full awareness and consciousness. They perceive their opponents’ low evaluation of their choice
to adopt a traditional lifestyle as a lack of appreciation and due respect for their intelligence. There are millions of women in all regions of the world who adhere to a religious or traditional ideology,
and believe it is a very important and meaningful guideline for their
lives.146
Several scholars have claimed that Western society should
take seriously the feelings, conviction, and choice of traditional and
religious women. The principles of many religions today and their
ideological foundations should not be utterly rejected by feminists
claiming that religion oppresses women. They suggested that women’s struggles for the increase of equality and the narrowing of power
gaps between men and women should be the preferable policy.147
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Id. at 170.
Id. at 158, 163.
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Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Public Discourse, Religion, and Women’s Struggles for
Justice, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077, 1088 (2002).
146
Cf. CAROLINE RAMAZANOGLU, FEMINISM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF OPPRESSION
151 (1989); Fiorenza, supra note 145, at 1084; see also Emily Fowler Hartigan, Practicing
and Professing Spirit in Law, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1165, 1167–68 (1996) (regarding a
Catholic woman in the United States, who encountered hostility from feminist scholars as a
result of her religious belief and approach to current society).
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However, feminism should be implemented in a cautious manner.
Feminists should advance their agenda, but also reflect in their actions a desired understanding and respect for the religious culture in
which many women wish to act. The feminist movement should not
oppose or exclude the principles of religion, or ignore them, if it truly
wishes to aid all women, including those who maintain a religious
lifestyle.148
A new approach is evident in the feminist movement as a result of this criticism. Admittedly, coexistence between feminism and
religion has been problematic in Islamic society. Islamic principles
are sometimes patriarchal or were interpreted as such in the past, as
in the issues of polygamy or the laws of divorce. Scholars like Okin,
who held that feminist ideology should be dominant, wrote that the
coexistence of a feminist outlook with the principles of Islam is very
difficult. She preferred a pragmatic approach. She held that whenever possible, it is preferable that the change of rules and religious
practices should come from the inside. Women with a religious outlook should try to initiate a new interpretation of the principles of
their religious law in an attempt to enhance equality between the sexes.149
However, Okin was not optimistic about this process. She believed that often, religious law is rigid, and consequently the process
of change is problematic. She expressed her concern that the outcome of this process will not always be the elevation of women’s status in religious societies.150
Interpretation of religious law could assist women in Israel in
a specific context: conversion to Judaism. Within Jewish law, important scholars in recent generations have adopted an approach that
can assist those who wish to be accepted as converts, who are often
women. We should believe in the promise of interpretation of religious law. In one sphere of Jewish law—conversion to Judaism—the
rules in the modern period have often been interpreted in a manner
148

Fiorenza, supra note 145, at 1084.
Susan Moller Okin, Reply, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note
117, at 117, 122–23.
150
Although Okin thought that interpretation of religious law could produce effective results, she was not very optimistic about the outcome. Okin argued that the problem facing
women as a result of patriarchal principles in Islamic law should not be ignored. In this
sphere, there are not only difficulties concerning legal principles, but also practical difficulties, with which those who wish to abolish patriarchal trends in existing Islamic law will
have to cope. See id.
149
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that assisted females desiring to join the Jewish nation. This proves
that when interpreters of religious law wish to elevate the status of
women, they can apply an effective method of interpretation bearing
good results.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Israel was established in an attempt to create a shelter for
Jews in the Diaspora. In The Law of Return, Israel encourages the
immigration of Jews and those related to Jews and married to them to
the Jewish state. A Jewish and democratic state could impose limits
upon immigration to the state in an attempt to grant due weight to the
right of self-determination of the Jewish majority. The unique circumstances of Jewish history and survival justify this special policy
of affirmative action. The Jewish society in Israel has a right to preserve the characteristics of its cultural-national Jewish identity in a
unique Jewish state. From a liberal point of view, the right to culture
is important since it facilitates autonomy, which is possible only
when the individual has many good options. Furthermore, solidarity
is important in all societies including the society of a Jewish and
democratic state. An essential foundation of a strong and stable society is a strong mutual goal which is the foundation of the social contract of its members.
Many of the converts in Israel are immigrants and women. Israel should encourage, as much as possible, the implementation of a
lenient conversion policy for these converts. Sensitivity and empathy
to the converts and immigrants to Israel, and an attempt to avoid the
undesirable consequences of a strict religious approach in the sphere
of conversion, are desirable. An ancient Jewish text states that scholars of Jewish law, including the Dayanim in Rabbinical courts,
should enhance peace in the world.151 The path of peace is preferable. This perspective of Jewish law and the perspective of enhancing
autonomy, human liberty, and freedom coincide. And these perspectives lead to the same conclusion: the lenient approach is preferable
in the sphere of conversion of members of weaker segments in Israeli
society.
Within Jewish law, important scholars in recent generations
have adopted an approach that can assist those who wish to be ac-
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cepted as converts, who are many times women. When interpreters
of religious law wish to elevate the status of women, they can apply
an effective method of interpretation bearing good results.
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